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This study examines the relationship between the lack of economic development 
and unemployment against the eruption of civil unrest and political instability. I illustrate 
how political instability in one country is a cause for concern for neighboring countries 
within the region, thereby creating an incentive for the larger, international community to 
promote, support, and bolster economic activities and growth in said country. 
 
Within the field of international relations (IR), the efforts of governments, 
international organizations, and grassroots, non-governmental organizations in addressing 
development are the primary focus. However, the role of philanthropic organizations in 
promoting development and economic development abroad is less frequently examined. 
This thesis demonstrates how philanthropic activities can promote economic 
development and sustain international peace and security using Ghana and Nigeria as 
case studies.  
 
Philanthropy has an important role in promoting stability in international 
relations, albeit indirectly. When conducted as results-oriented, investment activities, it 
can improve the quality and quantity of economic opportunities available to citizens. 
Consequently, high levels of social discontent and unrest that often trigger protests, 
uprisings, and violence will decrease, thereby reducing the potential of conflict spillover 








In this study, I examine the relationship between the lack of economic 
development and unemployment against the eruption of civil unrest and political 
instability. I also illustrate how political instability in one country is a cause for concern 
for neighboring countries within the region, thereby creating an incentive for the larger, 
international community to promote, support, and bolster economic activities and growth 
in said country. Within the field of international relations (IR), the efforts of 
governments, international organizations such as the United Nations and World Bank, 
and grassroots, non-governmental organizations in addressing development are the 
primary focus. However, the role of philanthropic organizations in promoting 
development and economic development abroad is less frequently examined. To this 
objective, this paper will examine how U.S. philanthropic activities can promote 
economic development using Nigeria as a case study.  
 
Nigeria has experienced decades of sectarian violence which is often 
misconstrued as an issue of religious conflict. Although recognizing that such tensions 
can often stem from sectarian differences, this study will take an economic approach and 
argue instead that the tensions between Islamic and Christian groups that divide the 
country more accurately arise from high poverty levels and severely unequal distribution 
of wealth. The region is steeped in competition for strained resources including lack of 




opportunities. In other words, ethnic tensions and violence are driven by economic 
disparity.  
 
Here, as we have witnessed in other parts of the world, lack of access to economic 
opportunities can lead to discontent, protest, and violence, with large ramifications for 
spillover and the spread of conflict into cross-border regions. A complex relationship 
exists between economic growth and political stability, leading some to argue for a direct, 
causal relationship that growth leads to stability, while others contend the inverse to be 
true. This paper does not intend to disregard or lessen the influence of each of these 
factors and recognizes the circular interaction that exists between them. However, the 
scope of this paper lies specifically in exploring and highlighting the impact of economic 
growth and development as one of several factors in reducing conflict and political 
instability.  
 
Additionally, I argue that philanthropic organizations can reduce poverty levels 
and have a role in creating economic opportunities and spurring growth at the local level. 
There are opportunities for reducing ethnic and group tensions when citizens are 
economically engaged which would constitute a positive gain for the larger objective of 
sustained international peace and security, and the role of philanthropic organizations in 
this effort is one worth exploring. I also argue that philanthropy has an important role in 
promoting stability in international relations, albeit indirectly. Philanthropy, when 
conducted as results-oriented, investment activities can improve the quality and quantity 




Domestic Product (GDP) growth more likely follows which reduces high levels of 
discontent and unrest that often trigger conflict and have the potential to spillover and 
affect cross-border areas. 
 
To begin, I will review secondary sources of information, including economic 
data sets and scholarly literature in the forms of books, chapters, articles, and news 
reports to examine the relationship between economic growth and political and civilian 
security. Following this I will survey the traditional methods of delivering foreign aid 
with a special focus on philanthropic trends and activities, as well as the role of 
philanthropies in providing aid and promoting economic growth in developing countries. 
And finally, I will examine various types of funding mechanisms carried out by 
philanthropic organizations in both Ghana and Nigeria including traditional grant-making 
models in contrast to philanthropic driven projects in venture capital and impact 
investment approaches. There is an accountability mechanism built into these strategies 
that produce greater, more sustainable and quality results at levels that straight grant-
making models do not necessarily produce. This paper will look to make a case for 
philanthropic strategies vis-à-vis venture capital and impact investment schemas as the 
preferred method for achieving levels of economic stability that will positively impact 
regional security.  
 
Background 
Recent global events illustrate the significance of access to jobs and employment 




This relationship has been portrayed in several regions including the civilian protests in 
Egypt during 2011 which led to the eventual collapse of the Mubarak regime, continued 
political strife and upheaval in the Kashmir region between Indian and Pakistani youth 
vying for a limited number of job opportunities, riots springing from disenfranchised 
Muslim youth in France during the summer of 2010, “Occupy Wall Street” 
demonstrations spreading across the United States rallying  against corporate greed and 
joblessness, and protracted and violent ethnic disputes among tribal groups in Nigeria 
stemming from competition for strained resources such as employment opportunities and 
access to agricultural lands among other issues.  
 
The aforementioned events that unfolded in Egypt serve as a poignant example 
that underscores the suggestion that economic stability does indeed have ramifications for 
domestic security (and consequently regional security by way of spillover effects). This 
relationship is apparent in the onslaught of mass protests and riots that took place in the 
streets of Tahrir Square in Egypt in 2011, which brewed from growing discontent and 
frustrations over rising unemployment rates and spurred a civilian movement that shook 
Mubarak’s politically autocratic regime and loosened its grip. Specifically, Egyptian 
youth played a significant role in building momentum and leading the charge in a 
passionate and powerful, collective demand for change. These developments created a 
ripple effect in the Middle East, igniting waves of demonstrations in the region including 
the Arab Spring movement. The magnitude, scale, and explosive potential of deeply 
entrenched frustrations of a restive unemployed constituency in these countries served to 




countries to those experiencing internal strife also began to recognize the costs of 
absorbing displaced persons both economically and towards national security goals. 
Consequently, more attention is now being paid to the need for job creation, especially 
among youth. In Ghana for example, the National Youth Employment Programme was 
initiated in 2006 and continues to be the largest government effort to date aimed toward 
training, preparing, and building the capacity of youth beneficiaries to secure permanent 
employment positions in eighteen sectors including agriculture, oil, education, and 
sanitation. The country’s high unemployment rates and especially among youth had 
spurred this effort which was designed to create more job opportunities and open 
channels for employment by providing skills development support, internship 
placements, and on the job training; more recently the initiative has refocused its 
methodology on promoting entrepreneurial approaches and helping beneficiaries to 









 Internal instability, chaos, and the inability of governments to ensure law and 
order and security for constituents within territorial boundaries have been cited by several 
scholars as a source of potential conflict that can erupt and flow across borders to the 
detriment of neighboring countries. In How to Rebuild Africa, Stephen Ellis describes 
two frequently shared characteristics of dysfunctional states, including the inability to 
guarantee law and order within its territory and to fulfill duties affecting the international 
community at large.
1
 Further, he states that failed states which embody these 
characteristics can be dangerous for the maintenance of international security, 
specifically noting the events of September 11, 2001 to illustrate this point. For example, 
chaos in Afghanistan led to detrimental spillover effects that jeopardized the security of 
other nations internationally.
2
 Ellis’ descriptive analysis is appropriate in examining the 
state of Nigeria where internal security issues have continued to worsen, thus leading to a 
potential spillover situation and threatening regional security. The domestic security 
situation in Nigeria will be covered in greater detail in subsequent pages.  
 
Building on Ellis’ forecast, Alberto Ades and Hak B. Chua make the case that 
spillover tendencies can reduce economic growth in neighboring countries. This study 
highlights the consequences and costs to the regional community if political instability in 
neighboring countries is ignored. The authors illustrate specifically that it is the economic 
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performance of states not directly involved in the conflict that will duly experience 
decline.
3
 It supports the argument that having politically stable countries as neighbors 
will mean less potential for conflict spillovers that threaten security. Furthermore, 
ensuring or aiding this goal should be regarded and pursued as sound foreign policy by 
those countries not directly involved. Steven Radelet also examines the relationship 
between political stability and economic growth. In Emerging Africa, he discusses five 
fundamental changes that have brought about improved economic, political, and 
developmental growth in seventeen Sub-Saharan African (SSA) nations. He places 
paramount emphasis on improved democratic climates, more accountable governments, 
and stronger leadership as the key to economic growth in these countries.
4
 According to 
Radelet, the economic growth that has been prevalent in these emerging countries is 
firstly the product of a shift toward more democratic systems of government.
5
 Noting that 
all of the seventeen emerging economies in SSA first attained the scores outlined by the 
Freedom House and Polity IV standards to be considered as democracies, Radelet 
explains that economic growth and improved governance soon followed. 
6
 Improved, 
democratic governance has meant that leaders are more accountable to their citizens and 
has allowed better economic policies to be put in place which in turn has spurred growth 
that has provided citizens with tangible benefits.
7
 Although arguing for a relationship that 
progresses in this sequential order, Radelet also recognizes that accelerated growth has 
the ability to reinforce democratic practices and better governance, stating that “it appears 
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that they are connected in a virtuous circle in which improvements in one area helps 
support improvements in the others.”
8
   
 
Similarly, Jenny Minier asserts that countries with more democratically stable 
governments also see higher economic growth whereby “…political freedoms reinforce 
economic freedoms.”
9
 Although this is the crux of Minier’s argument, she does 
acknowledge the reverse, a relationship that earlier several theorists and scholars had 
declared in research literature. She cites Huntington’s study which highlighted the role of 
economic growth in building democratic political systems in Greece, Spain, Brazil, South 
Korea, and Taiwan.
10
 Additionally, Minier notes arguments by Lipset, Moore and 
Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, whom identify a larger middle class as a result of 
economic growth which subsequently influences and shapes norms and values (both 




Dambisa Moyo however, rejects Minier’s argument that democracy leads to 
economic growth. Instead, Moyo states “What is clear is that democracy is not the 
prerequisite for economic growth that aid proponents maintain. On the contrary, it is 
economic growth that is a prerequisite for democracy…”.
12
 Several other scholars are 
also in agreement with Moyo’s assertion. In Political Instability and Economic Growth, 
Alberto Alesina et al., offers low economic growth as a contributing factor to government 




 Jenny A. Minier. (1998). Democracy and Growth: Alternative Approaches. Journal of Economic Growth, 
(3), p. 243. 
10
 Ibid, p. 243-244. 
11
 Ibid, p. 244. 
12
 Dambisa Moyo. (2009). Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way for Africa. 






 Particularly, they find that in nondemocratic states, low growth is a source of 





Richard Posner echoes a similar argument, concluding that a higher median 
income is a stronger indicator of political stability than a higher average income.
15
 That 
is, ensuring that general income levels are higher overall (i.e. growing a middle class) is 
more critical to maintaining political influence and would be more beneficial towards this 
end than cultivating an upper class with disproportionately higher incomes than the rest 
of the masses.
16
 Posner illustrates this point by raising the examples of “riots in slum 
neighborhoods in U.S. cities and in French suburbs (black in the United States, North 
African immigrants in France) [which] confirm the existence among the permanently 
poor or near-poor of smoldering resentments exacerbated by social neglect.”
17
 However, 
because the larger constituency in these nations lean toward middle class status, they are 
able to bolster and support political regimes (and therefore, contribute to political 
stability) that may be targeted by the underclass in an effort to air its frustrations and 
discontent. As Minier notes, earlier scholars also drew similar conclusions.  
 
Seymour Martin Lipset conducted extensive studies on the impact of various 
economic indices including wealth, urbanization, education, and industrialization and the 
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consequences of these factors for democracy.
18
 Wealth, as Lipset defines, is measured by 
per capita income, the number of persons for every motor vehicle and for every 
physician, as well as the number of radios, telephones, and newspapers per every 
thousand persons in a country.
19
 With regard to per capita income, he finds more 
democratic, European countries yielding an average of $695 versus $308 in less 
democratic countries.
20
 In Latin America, he finds a similar trend of $171 for more 
democratic counties in the region as compared to $119 in ones that are less so.
21
 The 
relationship between education and democracy is also illuminated through his studies, 
offering that increased education serves to broaden the individual outlook of man, 
increase tolerance, reduce inclinations toward extremism, and strengthen the capacity of 
man to make rational choices as they relate to electoral activities and decision making.
22
 
As such, Lipset argues that increased income, economic security, and education can lead 
citizens to assume more complex and gradualist political perspectives which in turn 
reduces their commitment to more extremist political views that counteract the 
development of democratic systems.
23
 Furthermore, Lipset contends that increased 
wealth “affects the political role of the middle class through changing the shape of the 
stratification structure so that it shifts from an elongated pyramid, with a large lower-
class base, to a diamond with a growing middle-class. A large middle class [he offers] 
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plays a mitigating role in moderating conflict since it is able to reward moderate and 




Samuel P. Huntington cites a study conducted in 1981 which further promotes a 
positive correlation between economic development and the prevalence of free and 
democratic governments. The study compared the World Bank’s rating of countries in 
terms of economic development with their Freedom House’s ratings on the measure of 
liberty and found two of thirty-six low-income countries to be classified as “free” or 
democratic, fourteen of sixty middle-income countries to fall under the same category, 
and eighteen of twenty-four high-income countries to be classified accordingly.
25
 
Referencing this study, Huntington states that countries occupying a higher rung on the 
economic ladder will likely be more democratic as well.
26
 While maintaining that there is 
a strong correlation between wealth and democracy, Huntington does acknowledge that 
both could be caused by a third factor. He cites Protestantism as one of these factors 
which has been argued by some to have brought about capitalism and democracy.
27
 
Moreover, although Huntington recognizes the counter argument that democracy could 
indeed spur economic wealth and development, he maintains that high rates of economic 
wealth are preceded by high rates of economic growth which does not necessarily require 
democratic systems.
28
 Therefore, Huntington concludes that “it seems unlikely that 
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Finally, Evelyne Huber, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and John D. Stephens also 
promote the causal relationship between economic development and democracy. Their 
explanation however offers that economic growth and development functions to 
transform class structure. As a result, the working and middle-class become more 
efficient and capable at self-organizing which makes it more challenging for elites to 
exclude them from political activities and other forms of participation.
30
 The argument 
for ensuring economic growth and development in the pursuit of sustaining political 
stability and security is an important relationship that supports the need for investment in 
job creation and the expansion of access to employment opportunities which will be 
further discussed in forthcoming chapters. 
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A Comparison of Economic Growth and Stability in Two African States 
It is apparent through a survey of the literature, that there is a strong scholarly 
support for the correlation between high economic growth and greater political or 
democratic stability. Two traditional indicators of economic growth include a country’s 
GDP which is described as the value of all goods and services produced by a country 
within a specific time period, and the Human Development Index (HDI) which measures 
a country’s progress toward human development along three dimensions including access 
to health, education, and income. According to data compiled by the African Economic 
Report, the following table illustrates the relative progress that Ghana has made along 
both indicators as compared to Nigeria. 
 
 Ghana Nigeria 
Real GDP change 2010 
7.7 7.8 
Real GDP change 2011 (estimated) 
13.7 6.7 
Real GDP change 2012 (predicted) 
8.3 6.9 




Source: African Economic Outlook 2012
31
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It is clear that Ghana outranks Nigeria on both economic indicators. The HDI is 
especially telling as it more closely indicates the standard of living and access to social 
services than does the GDP, which conveys little about the actual distribution of wealth.  
 
In addition to these indicators, access to employment opportunities is another 
economic indicator that conveys information about a country’s progress toward human 
development. In Global Employment Trends 2012, the International Labour Organization 
reports that progress toward the reduction of working poverty in the Sub-Saharan Africa 
region has been meager and along with South Asia, it is one of two regions globally that 
are unlikely to reach the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of halving poverty by 
2015. Moreover the report warns that lack of progress in reducing poverty may also 
derail growth and put at risk the successful attainment of other MDG goals in the areas of 
health and education.
32
 MDG progress in Ghana is substantially ahead of that which is 
seen in Nigeria as illustrated in the following chart which displays the percentage change 
in population living below the poverty threshold of $1.25 USD per day between the 
decade spanning from 1998 to 2008. 
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Towards the goal of eradicating extreme poverty, Ghana is well on its way to 
halving extreme poverty by the year 2015. In fact, the overall poverty rate in Ghana has 
been reduced from a 51.6% in 1995 to 28.5% in 2006; there is confidence that this rate 
will be further reduced to 26% well before 2015.
34
 Additionally, the proportion of the 
population living in extreme poverty has also declined from 36.5% to 18.2% between 
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In Nigeria however, progress towards this first MDG goal is meager. Comparable 
figures do not exist to measure progress in the Nigerian case. Instead, the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) offices in Nigeria report that “…the target will be 
difficult to meet. Growth needs to be more equitable and broad-based. Developing 
agriculture and creating jobs will require the public sector to create an enabling 
environment for business… and providing sustainable access to enterprise finance. Social 
protection and poverty eradication programmes need to be scaled-up and better 
coordinated.”
36
 The lack of data is telling of the slow progress and challenges faced by 
Nigeria in pursuing economic growth that is more equitably distributed and ensuring the 
well-being of its citizens through poverty alleviation.  
 
Taking these figures into consideration it is unsurprising to learn that the 
unemployment rate in Nigeria by far overshoots that which is prevalent in Ghana at 21% 
and 11%, respectively.
37
 Between the period of 1997-2000, Ghana saw a sharp decline in 
the unemployment rate, starting at 20% and dropping to 11%.
38
 The Nigerian experience 
however, seems to be regressing instead and while there was an extreme decline in 
unemployment between 1992-2005, from 28% to 2.9%, this rate has increased in the past 
several years jumping to 5.8% in 2006 to a slight drop to 4.9% in 2007, and soaring to a 
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Moreover, falling within the category of the unemployed is a significant and 
unsettling mass of jobless youth. Nick Mead reports, “around 60% of the [African] 
continent’s unemployed are aged 15 to 24 – and more than half of these, many women, 
have given up on finding work.”
40
 The rise in youth unemployment is particularly 
disturbing as this population is not only growing rapidly but also becoming better 
educated.
41
 By 2030, it is projected that 59% of Africa’s youth aged 20-24 years will 
have attained a secondary education as compared with 42% today, or 137 million youth 
completing secondary education and 12 million obtaining tertiary degrees by the same 
year.
42
 While this presents an enormous opportunity for economic development if 
governments are able to harness this reservoir of human capital and talent, it may also 
pose a challenge to political stability if lack of access to employment opportunities and 
joblessness persists, creating an extremely difficult environment for securing a decent 
standard of living.
43
 Melanie Standish and Gale Muller reiterate a similar sentiment 
stating that the “desire for jobs underpinned the Arab Spring, forcing Middle Eastern 
countries to rethink their job creation efforts and… providing greater opportunities for 
youth employment.”
44
 A 2011 MDG report echoes a similar cautionary note. The report 
indicates that 20% of North African youth were unable to find jobs in 2008.
45
 This poor 
employment climate forced many youths to flood the informal sector and engage in low-
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productivity jobs which authors of the report suggest, may have contributed to the 
brewing social and economic conditions that culminated in the wave of protests that 
swept the North Africa and Middle East regions.
46
 Taking this into consideration, African 
governments should be keen to reinvigorate job creation efforts in order to avoid 
potential demonstrations and riots as those led by the Arab Spring. 
 
A macroeconomic model devised by Gallup outlines the general development 
pathway that according to researchers, countries must follow in order to attain prosperous 
societies.
47
 According to the following framework, individual well-being is both an end 
goal and force that fuels positive growth and success in communities and in countries, if 
and when it is attained. 
 
 













Along this trajectory, access to basic needs such as food and shelter is one of the 
primary stepping stones toward individual and consequently, societal well-being. Access 
to “Good Jobs” both in quantity and quality occupies a mid-level residency on this 
trajectory course whereby “the availability of good jobs correlates with higher well-
being.”
49
 This Gallup study further bolsters the case for investing in economic 
opportunities and job creation as a strategy for producing stable, prosperous, and thriving 
societies.  
 
 For this thesis, Ghana will be examined in a comparative analysis against Nigeria 
on the dimensions of security and stability, and economic growth and opportunity. 
Moreover, I will look at the impact of these factors on the level, type, and outcome of 
philanthropic activities in both counties. While they are disparate in many ways, there are 
also points of similarity that allow for robust comparison. For example, Ghana and 
Nigeria are both influential players in contributing to the maintenance of security in the 
West African region due to the size of their economies (although the distribution of this 
wealth is more skewed in the Nigerian case, which will be discussed in forthcoming 
chapters). Additionally, both Ghana and Nigeria have achieved active electoral 
democracy and citizen rule since the 1990s (although peaceful transitions have been more 
of a norm in Ghana, while rigged and corrupt practices still exist in Nigeria). Along these 
dimensions however, the contrasts that exist have impacted the direction of philanthropic 








investments in each country, leading to an unequal economic and employment growth 
rate that is in favor of Ghanaian development but contributive to continued instability in 
Nigerian economic and political security.  
 
 While Ghana has been referred to as a shining, model democracy in the West 
African region, Nigeria instead has been regarded as a country steeped in corruption, 
chaos, and violence. According to Erin Burnett, “In 2008, Nigeria was ranked 18
th
 out of 
the 60 most unstable countries on the Failed States Index of the Foreign Policy and Fund 
for Peace, U.S., and 129
th
 in the ranking of 140 most peaceful countries on the Global 
Peace Index of the Vision for Humanity, Australia.”
50
 Taking into consideration the 
Gallup World Path framework, the first milestone on the trajectory (law and order) is still 
unmet in Nigeria and the country is not faring well on the subsequent two milestones that 
serve as prerequisites to good jobs (i.e. food and shelter, and institutions and 
infrastructure). Accordingly, the ultimate achievement of quality GPD growth in Nigeria 
will be put at risk, which in return will feed discontent, unrest, and political instability as 
I have argued in previous sections.  
 
In a Congressional research report, Lauren Ploch, offers a harrowing estimate of 
more than 14,000 Nigerians who have been killed since 1999 due to sectarian and ethnic 
violence that often stems from a fierce competition for land rights, jobs, and other 
avenues of socioeconomic development.
51
 Not only is violence rampant in the country, 
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the Nigerian police and security forces have been accused of human rights abuses, guilty 
of unleashing brute force, violence, and even torture on some communities to stem 
unrest.
52
 Furthermore, rampant corruption within the Nigerian government and Nigeria 
Police Force has created an apathetic and tolerant culture toward violence in some areas 
leading warlords such as militant Islamist leader, Boko Haram, in the northern region of 




Expanding on Ploch’s research, A.E. Ojie describes a country where political 
assassinations occur widely, religious massacres and reprisal killings occur with high 
frequency, and a total disregard for and violence toward human life is the operative 
norm.
54
 In particular, Ojie asserts that Nigerian police have a large role in fueling this 
type of environment as they too take part in corrupt practices such as bribery, harassment, 
intimidation, and torture.
55
 This has resulted in high tensions between civilians and 
Nigerian security forces and sheds light on the serious problem that “… there is no 
dependable foundation for the maintenance of law and order in Nigeria by the police.”
56
 
As Ojie explains, the ramshackle state of law and order is particularly worrisome, for the 
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These factors are also hampering Nigeria’s advancement on Gallup’s World Path 
schematic, slowing progress toward the development of good jobs and ultimately the 
quality GDP and economic growth that will be needed in order to contribute to a more 
stable and secure nation. Other commentators and scholars on the issue of insecurity and 
instability in Nigeria identify similar root causes as those that Ploch touches upon in her 
research. J.J. Dibua for example, pinpoints the problem to a skewed distribution of wealth 
that benefits a minority population, and the marginalization and deliberate efforts on the 
part of the Nigerian government to disenfranchise certain ethnic groups by barring their 
access to lands and stripping their rights to use and control the natural resources that are 
abundant in those territories, among other forms of economic repression.
58
 As a response 
to increasingly violent tactics employed by the Nigerian Police Force to suppress civil 
unrest in these communities, youth groups have organized and responded by becoming 
increasingly militant in their reprisal strategies.
59
 In fact, in November of 1999 a 
confrontation between a large, militant organization comprised of over 5,000 youths 
culminated in what is known as the Odi massacre and led youths to resort to tactics such 
as kidnapping employees of oil companies, murdering security personnel, destroying oil 
installations, and stealing crude oil for sale on the black market.
60
 Such incidences 
illustrate the significance of economic opportunities such that the lack of access to the use 
and control of lands and natural resources can spur and fuel social unrest and political 
instability.  
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Further, Meg Handley offers what many Nigerians argue as the cause of violence 
to be rooted in a “scramble for land, scarce resources and political clout”
61
 as opposed to 
religious or ethnic differences. Moreover, “poverty, joblessness and corrupt politics drive 
extremists from both sides to commit horrendous atrocities”
62
 whereby herder 
communities from the north and farmers from the south fight over rights to fertile lands, 
and an unequal distribution of oil wealth in the Delta region has prompted citizens to 
resort to militant tactics in their demand for a greater share of revenue.
63
 The core 
motivation behind these conflicts can be attributed to a desire for greater economic 
agency, participation, and well-being. Elisabeth Rosenthal describes the situation as 
deteriorating and reports alarming youth unemployment rates. In urban areas, among high 
school and university graduates, aged 15-24 reaching nearly as high as 50% and 
Rosenthal attributes this to be main driver of discontent and crime.
64
 The most recent 
MDG report outlining progress and challenges in Africa specifically highlights the 
marginalization of youths as a pressing issue of concern for the continent. Africa, in fact, 
has the largest youth to total population ratio worldwide and their continued 
disenfranchisement will be a source of discord with the potential to erupt into violence.
65
 
Rosenthal further offers that according to experts, “the swelling ranks of unemployed 
youths with little hope have fed the growth of the radical Islamist group Boko Haram, 
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which has bombed or burned more than a dozen churches and schools this year.”
66
 Of 
greater concern is a potential link between Haram’s forces with al-Qaeda networks which 




In fact, Oladiran Bello writes, Nigeria is of central importance in efforts to 
improve security in the Sahel region overall which is currently pervaded by al-Qaeda 
operatives in Mali, Mauritania, and Niger.
68
 Bello warns that “regional stability is 
impossible without Nigerian leadership” as deteriorating security within its borders can 
mean increased “drug trafficking and other trans-border crimes linking West Africa and 
the Sahel.”
69
 He suggests that security efforts led by the European Union should focus on 
securing and stabilizing the northern region where Haram has been intensifying 
recruitment efforts and looking to accelerate the process of radicalization.
70
 Burnett adds, 
that violent and inhumane treatment by the government and state security forces have 
exacerbated the insurgency which has the grave potential to spread instability across the 
Gulf of Guinea and into neighboring Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea, both of which 




In addition to investing in job creation and youth employment in particular as 
mentioned above, another constituency that has historically been marginalized and 


















excluded from the formal employment sector are women. In Africa as a whole, women 
are disproportionately represented in the informal sector but make up less than 50% of all 
wage position in the non-agricultural sector.
72
 As the following chart indicates, Ghana 
surpasses Nigeria in the percentage of women employed in waged positions external to 
the agricultural sector. 
 
 




While this population is not as volatile, susceptible, and inclined to conduct 
violent, retribution tactics, they are an important group to bear in mind in the design and 
implementation of job creation efforts.   
 
                                                          
72
 United Nations Development Programme. (2011). Assessing Progress in Africa toward the Millennium 






 Ghanaian democracy however, is thriving in comparison. The peaceful transition 
that occurred during the last round of elections in 2009 which transferred power from 
John Kufuor of the New Patriotic Party to John Atta Mills of the National Democratic 
Congress signaled an era of robust and more imbedded democratic practices in the 
electoral process. Even further, when President Mills passed away in the summer of 
2012, John Dramani Mahama was sworn in immediately just two hours after the 
announcement of Mills’ death. This historical moment signaled a rare but emerging 
commitment to the constitution and by expansion, the democratic system. Ghana is 
making substantial progress as compared to Nigeria on the MDG goals including major 
improvements in efforts to eradicate extreme hunger and poverty, and to provide 
universal primary education.
74
 As such, along Gallup’s World Path framework, Ghana is 
on course and ahead of Nigeria in achieving quality GPD growth. Furthermore, as 
mentioned in earlier sections, a stronger Ghanaian economy based on GDP data and 
projections lends support to this statement. Finally, unemployment is also lower in Ghana 
than in Nigeria, while the HDI measure higher, which has likely contributed to the 
relative political stability that has been enjoyed by the country. In order to produce 
similar levels of security and political stability as apparent in Ghana, Nigeria will need to 
make heavy investments in democratizing economic participation, creating job 
opportunities for its expanding population and especially a growing, educated youth  
constituent, and promoting quality, distributive economic growth. And, these objectives 
can be achieved via innovative, philanthropic investment strategies which will be 
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The Contributive Potential of Philanthropic Work toward Global Development and 
Security Goals  
 Foreign aid has many advantages for both donors and recipients but may also 
result in repercussions and negative consequences for recipients. There are a multitude of 
motivations including being utilized as a diplomacy tool by donor countries to further 
economic or security agendas, and/or to gain political leverage. Further yet, other 





In surveying the landscape of IR theories of foreign aid, Tomohisa Hattori 
discusses the various studies that aim to answer the question: what is foreign aid? 
Political realists would define foreign aid as a policy tool that emerged during the Cold 
War in order to drive political loyalties in a bi-polar world order.
76
 Liberal 
internationalists take a more benevolent stance and describe the objective and function of 
foreign aid as a means to promote socio-economic and political development abroad.
77
 
Finally, Hattori uncovers the world system theory which establishes foreign aid as an 
instrument that restrains the development trajectories of recipient countries and 
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These answers however are lacking and incomplete according to Hattori. His main 
critique is that these theories simply address the function of foreign aid rather than its 
essence. Even further than exploring what foreign aid does is the examination of what 
foreign aid is, and to that objective, Hattori, maintains that it functions as a symbol of 
power hierarchies between the donor and recipient countries.
79
 Hattori expresses concern 
and critique for current theories that miss this point in their preoccupation with the policy 
objectives and effects of foreign aid.
80
 Instead, he prefers to conceptualize foreign aid as 
“the pervasive hierarchy between the industrialized states and their former colonies, 
[which has been] naturalized by a practice of extending and accepting gifts.”
81
 Hattori’s 
analysis centers solely on bi-lateral foreign aid relations. However, he is keen to 
emphasize that there are forms of aid that operate beyond the state level including 
individual donations, philanthropic aid, multilateral grants via international organizations 
and, what he terms as other types of “institutionalized giving practices.”
82
 These forms of 
foreign aid he argues, serve to further skew hierarchical structures between donors and 





While Hattori’s critique is important to keep in mind, there is also an expansive 
amount of good that can be derived from foreign aid programs, and specifically via 
philanthropic means. Howard Husock argues for philanthropic driven aid citing high 
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incidences of ineffectiveness in government run social services programs.
84
 Private 
donations however, would be a more appealing option because philanthropic 
organizations can often tailor programs and adapt efforts to local needs rather than 
inappropriately force “one-size-fits-all” federally designed programs onto communities 
that do not have the conditions necessary to achieve success.
85
 In addition, aid recipients 
of privately financed donations are expected to track progress and show results.
86
 These 
expectations lend to higher levels of both efficiency and effectiveness than programs 
funded by governments, which often the capacity to track, measure, and report results. 
 
Moyo adopts a similar view towards foreign aid disbursements taking place at the 
state-to-state or government-to-government level. She identifies the abundant aid flow 
into Africa as the source of continued poverty throughout the continent.
87
 For the past 
fifty years, she describes, aid has been poured into Africa leading African leaders and 
governments to believe that it is a consistent and permanent source of income that is 
unlikely to be cut off.
88
 Consequently, African governments have had little incentive to 
pursue sound, strong, and vigorous financial planning efforts or look for alternative 
capital and funding opportunities.
89
 According to Moyo, foreign aid in this form 
perpetuates poverty in a multistep manner. Firstly, free-flowing aid serves to prop corrupt 
governments by making available an unlimited and generous source of wealth and 
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income to leaders who disregard civilian liberties, reject the rule of law, and conduct 
activities – issuing economic, political, and social policy decisions – in a highly non-
transparent fashion.
90
 Moreover, opaque and corrupt environments tend to reduce and 
stifle private investments due to the increased risks that follow and reduced guarantees 
for return.
91
 As a result, fewer investments hamper economic growth which leads to 
fewer job opportunities and thereby, protracted poverty.
92
 Greater poverty levels prompt 
donor countries to disburse even more aid which subsequently reinforces a culture of 





Instead, as suggested earlier, instilling expectations for a strong return, including 
tracking, measurement, and reporting procedures would be important for donors to insist 
upon as a standard practice for aid recipients to produce. Moyo compares China’s 
endeavors in Africa as significantly more successful than that of the West. She writes 
“The secret of China’s success is that its foray into Africa is all business. The West sent 
aid to Africa and ultimately did not care about the outcome; this created a coterie of elites 
and, because the vast majority of people were excluded from wealth, political instability 
has ensued.”
94
 China, Moyo describes, expects and even demands a return for their 
investments, which leads to positive results such as job creation, infrastructure and road 
development, and food poverty alleviation.
95
 As these series of events and benefits 
















unravel, the average African becomes better off which helps to maintain political 
stability.
96
 Moyo maintains that it is absolutely a growing economy that precludes 
political stability and cites Singapore as one example of this claim. Singapore she 
describes is a nation of relative peace and order even in the absence of democracy 
because the median citizen enjoys more favorable economic conditions.
97
 Finally, she 
concludes that what Africa needs from the West is not more unrestricted aid but 
investment in the form of public-private partnerships and corporate leadership in foreign 
direct investments (FDI).
98
 Additionally, she calls for other “private-capital solutions to 
development financing,”
99
 which I will add, include an array of impact investing funding 
options. 
 
Other scholars also see value in increased corporate investment as one method to 
lift African nations out of poverty. Sandra T. Barnes describes a dilemma that many 
foreign corporation face when considering making investments in Africa. While they 
recognize that the region is an immense opportunity for profit gains, there are also 
challenges of infrastructural weakness, poor tax and other economic policies, and often 
corrupt, bureaucratic practices and political red tape that exist.
100
 Consequently, private 
sector actors have embraced strategic philanthropy in order to directly contribute to the 
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development of communities in which they operate and improve African livelihoods.
101
 
Barnes explains the evolution and rise of corporate engagement in this region as follows: 
 
The message that conflict and poverty are bad for business is giving rise to 
a fresh set of business practices that are making their way throughout the 
world by means of a new kind of corporate philanthropy. In the past three 
to five years, corporations have been attempting to increase their value and 
shield themselves from a multitude of negative forces – including the 
ramifications of working in weak states – by engaging in local community 





 To further illustrate the extent and potential of corporate-driven aid to contribute 
to development efforts in Africa, Barnes offers that multinational companies allocate 
between 0.5-4% of their in-country operating budgets every year to community 
development projects.
103
 She cites examples ranging from Alcoa’s $5 million investment 
in Guinean communities, which is just over 4% of its budget for annual operating 
costs.
104
 Moreover, General Electric has been an active player in South Africa, 
contributing $20 million to help build and strengthen health infrastructure in the 
country.
105
 Finally, of the five Shell companies based in Nigeria, one has spent $60 
million, making up 3% of its annual operating budget on community development 
















 While these figures look substantial and in many cases does in fact provide 
the much needed financial resources to have a positive impact on impoverished 
communities, Barnes adds that it should be noted that these contributions are not all for 




 Foreign corporations have a vested interest in seeing to the development and well-
being of the communities in which they operate. Daimler-Chrysler for example has 
recognized this after finding a way to use sisal (a plant fiber) in car interior parts. In order 
to ensure that their supply needs were met, the company helped local farmers return to 
and improve sisal production methods.
108
 Barnes explains that as the world marketplace 
becomes more competitive, companies are beginning to look for new opportunities at the 
base of the pyramid (BoP) where there is massive potential for tapping into an expansive 
consumer base. A report published by the Monitor Group references C.K. Prahalad’s 
contribution to directing attention and spurring interest in this sector. In his book titled, 
“The Fortune of the Bottom of the Pyramid,” Prahalad argues that the purchasing 
potential of this group is enormous and should be taken seriously by the corporate 
sector.
109
 Prahalad points out that there are billions of people living in poverty worldwide 
and together, they have a combined purchasing power of $5 trillion. In order for 
companies to achieve success in this space, they must contribute to building and fostering 
conditions in these communities that enable them to operate securely, sustainably, and 
with a potential for growth. Barnes references an argument by world renowned Harvard 
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economist, Michael Porter, who states that “in today’s business environment, an 
enterprise cannot expect to compete and survive unless it is integrated into and 




 A study by the Monitor Company Group finds that corporate initiatives aimed at 
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 The private sector is tellingly much stronger in South Africa than any other nation 
in SSA. There are a total of 32 national and multinational corporations operating in South 
Africa whose businesses target the BoP but only 6 companies in Ghana who do the 
same.
112
 Even more appalling is the fact that there is just 1 company operating in Nigeria 
that engages the BoP.
113
 Although undesirable this finding underscored the need and 
potential in Nigeria for corporate engagement with the BoP.  
 
 At the same time, while Barnes welcomes multinational contributions toward 
development efforts and goals, she also recognizes potential downfalls to this model. 
Firstly, similar to Hattori’s assessment, she does acknowledge that corporate giving 
dynamics can perpetuate power structures that cultivate and perpetuate a dependency 
culture.
114
 She also points out that there are many cases where payments to elite leaders 
and government officials in the form of taxes and profit cuts fail to reach the masses and 
intended recipients.
115
 Instead, these funds are squandered, further bolstering the 
economic status of the already well to do. This is a grave problem as resentment grows 
for those that benefit and has a tendency to erupt in the form of anger and violence.
116
 
Specifically, Barnes cites the tumultuous situation that is currently being witnessed in the 
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 Alberto Chong et al. echo a similar concern and in their research examine the 
effect of foreign aid on reducing poverty and income inequalities, they find that aid on its 
own does not have a significant effect on either measure.
118
 They also cite studies 
conducted by William Easterly and Rajan and Subramanian which also conclude that 
foreign aid has no effect on growth even when the quality of institutions (strong 
transparency and accountability, low corruption) is high.
119
 In fact, as Brautigam and 
Knack posit, aid may actually lead democratic institutions to deteriorate in quality.
120
 
According to Figure 1 below which illustrates the relationship between inequality (as 
measured by the Gini coefficient), foreign aid, and institutional quality, Chong et. al. 
report the following findings: When institutional quality is high (i.e. corruption is low), 
an increase in foreign aid flows from low to medium levels actually increases income 
disparity (i.e. income distribution becomes more unequal, or the Gini coefficient falls).
121
 
However, when aid increases from medium to high, the distribution of income is 
relatively unchanging.
122
 When considering recipient countries where the quality of 
institutions is weak, the study finds that income inequality does not change when aid 
increases from low to medium.
123
 Interestingly, however there is a sharp increase in the 
Gini coefficient when foreign aid pours into the system from medium to high levels.
124
 
This illustrates that inequality and disparity rises when corruption is high and yet aid 
continues to flow and is consistent with Barnes’ earlier aforementioned cautionary note.  
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Source: Alberto Chong, Mark Gradstein, &Cecilia Calderon. (2009). Can foreign aid 




 Furthermore, Huntington also cautions that economic development as yielded by 
foreign aid assistance may not necessarily produce more equality and more stability.
126
 
He contends, “It could well exacerbate regional differences, promote differential rates of 
social mobilization and economic well-being among ethnic group, and enhance 
communal consciousness through increasing literacy and education.”
127
 Instead, gradual 
(as opposed to rapid) improvements in economic conditions would help to counter the 
unbalanced and biased economic growth and increase in income inequality that may 
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result from foreign aid receipts. That is, rapid growth may contribute to politically 





 Despite these seemingly grave challenges and repercussions of foreign aid on the 
economic and political environments of recipient countries, it is important to note that 
there is a difference between traditional foreign aid in the form of state to state grant-
making and loan arrangements (which is the type of aid addressed in Alberto and 
Huntington’s analysis above) as opposed to the investment aid and capital via corporate 
players and strategic philanthropic means that is the focus of Barnes’ study. 
Alternatively, there are a plethora of benefits that a philanthropic model of foreign aid 
can generate. In an interview conducted by the Georgetown Journal of International 
Affairs, Thomas Pogge and Carol Lancaster promote this route arguing that philanthropic 
organizations and endeavors are not as inflexibly bound by government interests and 
priorities as traditional foreign aid program via government, or bilateral bodies.
129
 
According to Pogge, U.S. funded aid programs are often “… adulterated by other ulterior 
motives… [and] used as a policy instrument toward advancing the geostrategic interests 
of the United States.”
130
 They offer however, that privately funded, corporate investments 
can improve the communities within which they operate and also increase profit potential 
at the same time.
131
 This strategy constitutes a type of market-based approach that 
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endorses and reinforces the triple bottom line approach of “doing good while doing 
business.”  
 
The adage illustrates a shift toward a growing culture of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR). In a panel discussion organized by the Council on Foreign 
Relations, Jane Wales explains that CSR has prompted business leaders and corporations 
to consider the impact of their operations on social change as well as points along the 
design, production, and consumption chain where they may contribute a value add.
132
 
Further, Carol Adelman sees an enormous potential in building the CSR sector. In fact, 
she cites that private donations to the developing world surpassed those made by the 
government for the first time in the 1990s.
133
 Whereas 80% of aid contributions from the 
developed world were government funded in the 1950s with only 20% being private 
donations, the most recent figures show a shift toward privately funded foreign aid.
134
 
Today, only 13% of all aid flows originating from developed countries are government 
funded while a staggering 80% are privately sourced.
135
 These financial resources include 
investment capital, remittance payments, as well as traditional, philanthropic grants.
136
 A 
percentage of these privately funded donations are also comprised of corporate giving 
and private sector philanthropic programs.  
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In a study examining the ethics of foreign direct investments and exploring how 
companies can contribute to social good while turning a profit at the same time, Roland 
Bardy, Stephen Drew, and Tumenta F. Kennedy have identified a tremendous 
opportunity for companies to make foreign investments in Africa, noting several reasons 
including a report by UNCTAD that FDI in Africa yields the highest rate of return in the 
world as evidenced by the following chart: 
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They write, “While not yet as competitive as the BRIC countries, the 
demographics bode well for Africa as a market as more than half its population is under 
the age of 24. Europe’s population will lose 60 million people by 2050, however, Africa 
will add 900 million.”
138
 The population bulge in Africa, while worrisome and may 
become a development challenge, can also be regarded as an enormous business 
potential. Opportunities for tapping into the millions that make up the market at the BoP 
are ample and can be sought in the expansion of education sector, of healthcare and 
banking services, as well as the proliferation in need for infrastructure in addition to 




Charles Roxburgh et al. further emphasize the opportunity to conduct business 
with this growing population reporting an estimate of about 85 million African 
households earning $5,000 or more.
140
 This is the income level at which half of all 
earning are spent on items other than food.
141
 In the next ten years, this number is 
expected to grow by 50% bringing the number of households with discretionary income 
to 128 million.
142
 By 2030, it is projected that the combined spending power of the top 
eighteen cities in Africa could reach $1.3 trillion.
143
 These figures should provide 
corporations, foundations, and other investors with the incentive to conduct business and 
                                                          
138
 Roland Bardy, Stephen Drew, &Tumenta F. Kennedy. (2012). Foreign Investment and Ethics: How to 
Contribute to Social Responsibility by Doing Business in Less-Developed Countries. Journal of Business 




 McKinsey Global Institute. (2010). Lions on the move: The progress and potential of African economies. 











pursue strategic, philanthropic activities in the region. And, the potential rate of return in 
targeting this consumer base is phenomenal.  
 
In addition to the lure and attractiveness of a growing consumer base with 
discretionary income, there are several other reasons for investing in African economies. 
Firstly, what is most troubling as described in a report by the Rockefeller Foundation is 
the decline in resources and budget cuts resulting in smaller foreign aid packages from 
the West.
144
 The report notes that “Philanthropic giving was uneven and declining in 
some areas for both domestic and international projects.”
145
 This reality signals a need to 
shift from development dependency on traditional foreign aid assistance to strategic, 
philanthropic methods that prioritize investment and impact for results. Furthermore, as 
the map below indicates, the value of reported investments in 2011 was skewed and there 
is large gap between amounts invested in Africa as compared to other regions of the 
world. 
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This illustrates a large potential and also need for further investment in Africa as a 
whole. A second reason, why the development landscape will begin relying on 
philanthropic giving and investments as opposed to receiving funding from a depleting 
reservoir of government backed foreign aid assistance packages, is their deteriorating 
legitimacy with the public. A report by the Council on Foundations offers the following 
insight:  
 
As governments lose capacity, they are losing public trust. The result is an 
increasingly hostile and polarized political environment. We are seeing 
growing social discontent and protests such as the Occupy and Tea Party 
movements in the United States and riots linked to severe austerity 






measures in Europe. More and more, the public is looking to the business 





On a promising note, we are seeing evidence of increasing corporate engagement 
in this arena as they begin to recognize the large potential for growth in African 
economies. Private capital flows to Africa have risen substantially beginning in 2003 as 
the following chart illustrates: 
 
 
Source: McKinsey Global Institute
148
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 In fact, FDI grew from just $9 billion in 2000 to $62 billion in 2008.
149
 This 
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Opportunities for Strategic Philanthropy: Investment Climate, Methods, and Obstacles to 
Growth 
 Not only is the consumer population growing and strengthening as discussed in 
previous chapters, the labor force in Africa is also expanding at an unprecedented rate. 
By the year 2040, it is projected that there will be 1.1 billion Africans of working age.
150
 
And as illustrated below, this would mean that Africa’s workforce is expected to surpass 
that of both India and China’s. 
 
 










Roxburgh et al. suggests taking steps to harness this human capital by providing 
the education and skills they need to succeed.
152
 This in turn can significantly boost 
worldwide consumption and production levels.
153
 Also important to note is the 
deleterious consequences that may ensue if governments and societies fail to engage this 
large workforce. Continued population growth without expanded access to jobs both in 
quality and quantity can cause friction in society. Therefore, I echo Roxburgh et al. and 
argue that it is of increasing urgency to engage this growing constituency so that they are 
appropriately absorbed into the formal, economic sector. 
 
In addition to the capital potential that Africa’s growing population provides by 
way of serving as both a large consumer base and productive labor force, three other 
major industries that form a combined potential business worth of $2.6 trillion by the 
year 2020 are resource extraction, agriculture, and infrastructure as illustrated in the chart 
below: 
 















 The resource extraction industry in Africa includes petroleum drilling as well as 
mineral mining activities. In Nigeria and more recently Ghana, oil production has 
generated a substantial revenue stream for both nations. However, the extent to which oil 
wealth has reached the masses in Nigeria is problematic and has been a source of 
sustained corruption and disparity between the classes. 
 
 Agricultural development however has a large potential of impacting the masses 
and improving their livelihoods and wellbeing. The African continent alone amasses 60% 






of the world’s share of total uncultivated, arable land.
155
 For companies, agricultural 
pursuits and development of the sector holds enormous business potential. In addition, 
because Africa experiences low crop yields, there is a ripe opportunity for igniting a 
“green revolution” which not only would transform the sector as was witnessed in Asia 
and Brazil but also improve the livelihoods of farmers and create jobs both in upstream 
and downstream markets.
156
 New business opportunities would arise exponentially at a 
rate that Roxburgh et al. estimate would lead to a $35 billion market for upstream inputs 
(of which fertilizer products would constitute the largest share) by 2030, from current 
values at around $8 billion.
157
 This figure translates to a $14 billion potential revenue for 
suppliers and in $3 billion in profits.
158
 Similar projects for downstream markets are 
estimated to grow from a value of approximately $40 billion to $240 billion in 2030, with 




Roxburgh et al. do however recognize challenges in Africa’s agriculture sector 
which stifles production levels including lack of access to and use of advanced seeds 
which are able to overcome the harsh ecology found on the continent, poor road 
infrastructure which hampers the transportation of crops to markets, unfavorable trade 
barriers, weak and unclear laws regarding the use and ownership to land rights, and lack 
of access to financing for farmers.
160
 Fortunately, if these barriers to growth can be 
overcome, there would be potential for sector output to increase from $280 billion to 
















$880 billion by 2030.
161
 Furthermore, this would mean that demand for upstream 
products such as seeds and fertilizers would grow, leading to an increase in downstream, 
processing activities such as grain refining.
162
 The yield and output potential exhibited in 
this sector is a lucrative market for which CSR and strategic philanthropic investments 
should be made. Additionally, there are vast opportunities for job growth toward which 
companies could contribute. And finally, expanded access to employment would not only 
create a larger consumer base with more disposable income to spend but also improve 
livelihoods and in turn, political and social stability. 
 
 Of special interest to note, improvement of the agriculture sector via increased 
investment aid could reduce already strained resources and competition for employment 
in urban areas. Jobs added in this sector could attract youth and human capital from urban 
cities and potentially reverse urban migration patterns, alleviating tensions that result 
from competition over scarce jobs and contributing to stable social and political 
environments.  
 
 Similar business opportunities and investment needs as discussed above for the 
agricultural sector exist in the infrastructure space. African governments and private 
companies have currently invested an estimated $72 billion in infrastructure projects.
163
 
Further, we are seeing an interest and growth in investments from private sources which 
account for 13% of the total directed into the emerging markets (an increase from 7% in 












 In spite of growth in activity levels, Africa still needs $46 billion more per year 
in order to meet infrastructure gaps in power and water distribution, and transportation 
infrastructure.
165
 And, according to Roxburgh et al., this funding gap could be met 
through a combination of spending programs allocated by African governments, private 




 As discussed, the investment landscape for strategic philanthropic activities is 


















Acceleration in Africa’s economic growth rate after 2000 translates into new, and 
more commercial opportunities for the private sector to seize. Consequently, corporations 
are increasingly recognizing the business potential of impact investing, as well as value in 
pursuing these strategies to enhance triple bottom line returns in financial, social, and 
environmental arenas; strategic investment toward generating impact and results emerges 
as a preferred approach to development aid. The Council on Foundations offers the 
following explanation as a motivation for the investment approach, stating, “the reason 
we use investment is to distinguish between charity and philanthropy.”
168
 This is an 
important distinction that communicates an expectation toward result-oriented, 
development aid versus traditional and often ineffective, grant-making approaches. 
Additional emerging trends in corporate giving strategies are offered below: 
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Apparent in this comparison is a shift in mindset toward the ultimate objective of 
value creation.
170
 Moreover, the outlook would place emphasis on value that fulfills both 
profit and social development objectives.   
 
In collaboration with the Acumen Fund, a venture fund that invests in social 
enterprises to alleviate global poverty, the Monitor Group conducted extensive research 
and assessments that culminated in a report titled, “From Blueprint to Scale: The Case for 
Philanthropy in Impact Investing.” The study advocates an alternate channel for 
philanthropic investment that is different than the corporate-led strategies and 
motivations discussed above. Instead, Harvey Koh, Ashish Karamchandani, and Robert 
Katz promote a practice which they term “enterprise philanthropy.” According to them, 
the availability of impact capital alone will not necessarily unlock the full potential of the 
industry to affect social and environmental development while generating a financial 
return at the same time.
171
 Even though venture funds may exist, the challenge lies in 
finding “good opportunities to invest for impact.”
172
 The reason, explains Koh et al., is 
the exorbitant risks that investors must absorb when engaging social ventures at the 
embryonic stage. Katherine Milligan describes the expansion of social enterprise ventures 
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as an emerging “fourth sector.”
173
 As illustrated below, social enterprises merge both for-







These enterprises take market-based approaches toward alleviating poverty and 
social ills for those living at the BoP.
175
 They are characterized by similar objectives 
aimed toward tapping into potential consumers at the BoP while offering ‘push’ products 
such as preventative healthcare which differs from ‘pull’ products such as mobile 
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 ‘Push’ products are more difficult to sell than desireable and marketable ‘pull’ 
products and require high up-front expenditures to bring to scale.
177
 This creates a very 
challenging environment for enterprises to operate and reduces investor confidence. In 
surveying over 400 enterprises in Africa, the Monitor Group learned that only a small 
percentage (13%) were operating at scale.
178
 Thirty-two percent of these enterprises 
however had a potential for scale but a majority were still risky investments that were not 
yet proven as strong business models with a potential for financial returns.
179
 As a result, 
a circular and self-reinforcing problem ensues whereby impact investors seek strong, 
viable investment opportunities but are presented with weak portfolios and pioneer 
entrepreneurs are unable to secure the financing necessary at early stages of business 
development in order to bring their models to par. A financial service gap thus exists for 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) which perpetuates the challenging investment 
climate that is all too familiar to investors in this region. Koh et al. however promote 
enterprise philanthropy as a crucial sector that should be nurtured, contending that it will 
play a significant role in providing the early-stage capital needed in order to grow 
inclusive businesses to a stage in firm development that is attractive to impact investors.  
 
There are also various other types of investment funding options that are available 
to social entrepreneurs. These options are outlined below:  
  

















As discussed earlier, aid in the form of traditional grant allocations do not require 
recipients to repay the aid amount. One downside to this model however is the tendency 
of encountering weaker results and lower rates of return as these expectations are not 
typically tied to the aid; the objective towards impact thus suffers. Additionally, grant aid 
is often bound by the issue areas of interest prioritized by the donor rather than those that 
are most pressing to the recipient, and the aid is subject to parameters set by the donor in 
regards to the scope of the issue addressed as well as methods for program 
implementation. Other financing structures include debt and private equity options as 
well as mezzanine and hybrid capital funds. The two main financing products that are 
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available to SMEs in Africa are debt and private equity.
181
 Still however, the financing 
amounts needed by entrepreneurs in this region are between $1,000 to $100,000 and 
investors typically avoid these types of investments because the upfront expenditures and 
transaction costs may be high.
182
 In these cases, there is a need for broader financing 
products to fill the financing gap for SMEs and in particular, early stage ventures.
183
 The 
types of products suggested by the Rockefeller Foundation include, “angel financing or 
royalty-based [repayment mechanisms] with manageable levels of interest and supporting 
business development services.”
184
 Non-profit philanthropic, investment funds can also 
help to fill this gap. A report conducted by Credit Suisse on impact investment in social 
enterprises reports an increase in the availability of these types of funds with some 
sustaining over $1 billion in capital. The report explains: 
 
These funds target SMEs because many believe them to be the best 
way to achieve the greatest social impact on local economies. This is 
mainly because SMEs then to be the backbone of most emerging 
economies, driving entrepreneurship and opportunity, job creation and 
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The fact that many businesses in West Africa are small, individual or family 
owned operations poses another challenge. For those businesses that are eligible for 
equity investments, there is a high resistance against giving up full ownership by 
accepting private equity capital.
186
 Most business owners instead are limited by the small 
range of debt options with which they are willing to accept.
187
 It would be important 
therefore to expand financial education and to encourage business owners to consider 
equity capital options.  
 
Clearly there are profit and social incentives for expanding the strategic 
philanthropic or “enterprise philanthropy” sector. Furthermore, growth in this area can be 
achieved via CSR and impact investment funding activities as discussed above. There are 
however numerous barriers that must be overcome in order to unlock the full potential of 
impact investing to produce not only profits but also the social and environmental returns 
that round out the triple bottom line objective. One of the major challenges that continue 
to stifle investor engagement is the weakness of measurement and evaluation 
mechanisms. Measurement, tracking, and reporting systems are not well developed and 
often inconsistent in the methods used (e.g. monitoring systems to track financial 
accounts
188
). The information however is critical data for investors, who are interested in 
assessing return on investments (ROI) values, output levels, results, and impact.
189
 
                                                          
186
 Rockefeller Foundation. (2012). Accelerating Impact: Achievements, Challenges and What’s Next in 




 Dalberg Global Development Advisors. (2012). Accelerating Impact: Achievements, Challenges and 
What’s Next in Building the Impact Investing Industry. New York: Madjiguene Sock, Angela Hansen, 
Liesbet Peeters, Susanne Normark Christensen, Afua Sarkodie-Kupka, Daniela Nwaobasi, & 
Abdourahmane Diop. 
189
 Council on Foundations. (2012). Increasing Impact, Enhancing Value: A Practitioner’s Guide to leading 




Developing accurate measurement systems would help to strengthen portfolios by 
establishing expectations for transparency and accountability, promoting outcome driven 
practices, and also encouraging investees to address challenges by reevaluating business 
or program designs and taking the appropriate actions to course correct implementation 
issues.
190
 Consequently, these activities would lead to increased investor confidence 
which would translate to greater readiness and interest to invest. 
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Philanthropic Activities, Progress, and Results in Ghana and Nigeria: Successes, 
Challenges, and Lessons Learned  
 There are a plethora of reasons and incentives to pursue philanthropy driven 
impact investments and grow activities in this sector. Economies can grow stronger 
leading to job creation and broader improvements in living standards; and restiveness, 
discontent, and violence igniting from social frustrations will also diminish. The 
following section will highlight some of the innovative programs and enterprises being 
implemented in Ghana and Nigeria to underscore the role that strategic philanthropy can 
play in reducing poverty through job creation and ultimately stabilizing political and 
social frictions. 
 
 The Rockefeller Foundation reports that most of the impact investments taking 
place in West Africa are occurring in Ghana which my research confirms.
191
 There are 
disproportionately more examples of impact investments and strategic philanthropic work 
being conducted in Ghana than in Nigeria. As the following table shows, there are 23 
private equity or venture capital funds targeting initiatives in Ghana while only 14 funds 
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 Although Nigeria lags behind Ghana in terms of being able to attract impact 
investors, there are some laudable examples of innovative and successful initiatives. The 
following examples will serve to further highlight these programs. 
 
Case Studies: Ghana 
 Savanna Farmer’s Marketing Company is a firm that is owned by a network of 
over 40 NGOs that are mostly church-sponsored and focus on development work in 
northern Ghana.
194
 This network comes together under the organization name of the 
Association of Church Development Projects (ACDEP).
195
 Savanna acts as a broker for 
smallholder farmers (SHF) to assist with getting their crops to market at fair prices. An 
estimated 12,000 SHFs benefit from services provided by Savanna.
196
 Clients include a 
local brewery owned by Guiness as well as Ghana Nuts, which exports various nuts to 
European and Asian markets at a level of 20,000 tons annually.
197
 SHFs that work with 
Savannah typically see an increase by about one-third in their incomes than if they were 
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to sell crops through local farm brokers.
198
 And, additional savings are made possible 
because Savannah absorbs and thus eliminates transportation costs to SHFs.
199
 Savannah 
also helps SHFs to obtain financing at favorable rates by engaging and collaborating with 
rural banks to arrange credit for SHFs.
200
 Preferential rates provided through these 
arrangements are much lower than those that would be offered by larger commercial 
banks (i.e. 28% versus 32-35%, respectively).
201
 Finally, Savannah will purchase crops 
from SHFs at guaranteed prices so that SHFs can plan their household finances with more 
consistency and confidence.
202
 The Savannah Company exemplifies a business model 
that aims to address the triple bottom line. It is able to generate profit by operating an 
export business that supplies local MNCs as well as foreign markets abroad. At the same 
time, SHFs receive substantial economic benefits; they are able to continue working in 
agriculture, observe an increase in incomes, and sustain their livelihoods. These outcomes 
all contribute to larger development goals of lifting people out of poverty. 
 
 Voltic is a water company operating out of Ghana that expanded its business to 
reach the BoP consumer market while also contributing to poverty alleviation through job 
creation. Prior to this expansion, the company sold 500 ml bottled water to higher-end 
consumers at $0.70 per bottle.
203
 Its market base was comprised of tourists, hotels, and 
upper-income Ghanaians.
204
 However, an opportunity to service the BoP consumer was 
soon recognized and Voltic developed a 500 ml sachet product priced at $0.035 per 




















 The new product was named Cool Pac. While there were already vendors and 
other street hawkers selling sachets on the informal market, Voltic believed that BoP 
consumers would recognize and attribute their brand to a quality product, thus 
eliminating the market challenge of selling a product at a higher price point.
206
 In the 
early stages of product development, Cool Pac was produced centrally in the capital of 
Accra.
207
 However, logistical and distribution challenges to reach rural markets beyond 
the city limits were costly and uncovered the need to decentralize production facilities.
208
 
The company took steps to rethink its business model which resulted in identifying local 
franchisees who were entrepreneurs with the capital and operational ability to run 
factories and distribution chains (e.g. to wholesalers and street hawkers) in outlying 
areas.
209
 Voltic split operational costs in half with these franchisees and observed a 
substantial growth in sales and profit.
210
 The company sells an estimated 500,000 sachets 
per day while creating 16 franchises, 560 jobs, and although informal, a source of income 
generation for an estimated 10,000 hawkers.
211
 Voltic serves as an example of a 
corporate-led, market-based solution toward poverty alleviation and underscores the 
significant impact that corporation can have on communities by weaving CSR into 
business models and practices.  
 
 The Ghanaian government also recognizes the strength and potential in pursuing 
an impact investment model towards development. It established the Venture Capital 


















Trust Fund (VCTF) in order to provide financial capital and resources to SMEs via 
venture capital finance companies.
212
 VCTF’s goal is “to create a vibrant and well-
structured venture capital industry boasting of investments in various sectors, leading to 
poverty reduction through job and wealth creation with a collateral growth in government 
revenues.”
213
 Starting with just $15 million in seed funding, VCTF has grown its capital 
pool to approximately $55 million.
214
 It has established five venture capital finance 
companies through which $17 million have been invested in SMEs resulting in the direct 
creation of 1,000 jobs as of the beginning of 2011.
215
 Some additional targets include 
increasing its fund pool beyond $100 million, providing education to business owners on 
the benefits of private equity investment options, and creating an Angel Investor Fund to 
attract high net-worth individuals that could expand financing options for SMEs.
216
 These 
activities have the potential to lift thousands of people out of poverty by creating jobs and 
employment in the SME sector. Moreover, as noted earlier, SMEs in emerging countries 
play a significant role in driving economic growth, which in conjunction with job 
creation will further alleviate the poverty that fuels discontent, violence, and social and 
political instability.   
 
Case Studies: Nigeria 
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 The strength of the investment climate in Ghana is thriving as compared to that of 
Nigeria’s. A survey of strategic, market-based, and impact oriented philanthropic 
investments indicates a skewed level of activity in Ghana. Although investments are 
markedly more abundant in Ghana, there are some examples of similar philanthropic 
strategies being implemented in Nigeria. One such example is MN Environmental 
Services Limited, a hygiene services and management company established in 2000 and 
operating out of Lagos, Nigeria. The company was created by Adeola Asaba and Jife 
Williams as an extension of their NGO, Metamorphosis Nigeria, which promotes safe 
practices in hygiene and sanitation. MN Environmental Services Limited constructs and 
maintains public showers and toilets in urban areas such as markets, transportation hubs, 
and slum settlements in order to improve access to sanitary facilities. Users are charged 
$0.24 to use the toilet and $0.32 to access showers. Moreover, these fees enable MN 
Environmental Services Limited to hire hygiene assistants from the poor and 
disadvantaged communities in which it operates and train staff not only to maintain these 
facilities but to also teach users about health related issues.
217
 This self-sustainable, social 
enterprise model has proven successful and the owners expect a rate of return of 24% on 
the company’s equity investment in the enterprise.
218
 Long-term goals include plans to 
construct 38 additional facilities in ten years which would directly create jobs for 260 




 Another example of philanthropic, impact investing activities in Nigeria is The 
Tony Elumelu Foundation which was established by Nigerian national, Tony Elumelu in 










2010. Its vision is “to contribute to Africa’s economic transformation and prosperity by 
equipping the African private sector to lead the transformation. [Additionally, it] 
recognises the power of impact investing and seeks to foster the acceptance, growth, and 
deployment of significant impact capital towards addressing social problems in 
Africa.”
220
 Particularly unique to this model is the Foundation’s focus on different stages 
of the business development cycle. Investments will be made not only toward businesses 
that are proven, viable, and scalable, but also to business students, start-up companies, 
SMEs, national companies, and both African owned multinational and global 
companies.
221
 The availability of investments to early-phase start-ups helps to alleviate 
the financial services gap that is often experienced by venture entrepreneurs. Finally, the 
Foundation is self-sustaining and with growing source of funds because all returns on 





   













 The multitude of uprisings, protests, and demonstrations that we witness in 
today’s world can be attributed to systemic failures in political, economic, and social 
infrastructure. While recognizing that political instability stems from a variety of factors, 
the scope of this thesis aimed to explore the economic conditions that contribute to 
exacerbating national instability. Moreover, I argue economic growth and job creation 
will alleviate poverty to levels that stifle political discontent and restore social stability 
and security. The international community should especially recognize its vested interest 
in assisting economic growth in other nations as the discontent and tensions that arise 
among the economically disadvantaged and marginalized has great potential to erupt into 
violence that will spill-over into neighboring countries and yield negative consequences 
for regional stability.  
 
My thesis supports this order of events by demonstrating greater levels of political 
stability and social security in Ghana than in Nigeria; I attribute stability in Ghana to 
advanced economic progress. Further, I demonstrate that Ghana’s economic and 
employment environment far exceeds that of Nigeria’s because there are greater, more 
impact and market-oriented, philanthropic activities taking place in the country. This 
argument is confirmed by illustrating higher levels of corporate initiatives, FDI, venture 




activities in Ghana. Accordingly, it would be prudent for the international community to 
devise foreign aid assistance programs and initiatives that embody these methods.  
 
Finally, these practices should be accelerated in Nigeria as to stifle the 
progression of increasing ethnic and class tensions that culminate in violent clashes 
which have the potential to spill-over into neighboring countries and affect stability in 
broader, regional contexts. In order to attract and grow the impact investment sector, it 
would be necessary for Nigeria to improve its economic and investment climate in the 
following ways: 1) Revise licensing rules and regulations as well as tax policy to 
encourage the informal sector to formalize. It is challenging for investors to conduct 
business with the informal business and therefore continued neglect to construct a formal, 
SME sector will perpetuate limited investment activities; 2) Develop financial resources 
and programs, and educational campaigns to reduce business owners’ resistance toward 
equity capital funding options thus enabling enterprise growth and expansion; 3) Attract 
angel financing to fill the financial gap for start-up companies with smaller capital needs 
than those typically offered and viewed warily as riskier investments; and 4) Support 
efforts to create standardized measuring, tracking, and reporting systems in order to 
entrench transparency and accountability expectations as to instill investor confidence 
and encourage greater investments. Such steps would improve the impact investment 
landscape in Nigeria, while the market-based solutions pursued would increase economic 
development, create jobs, and reduce poverty levels. Only through the improved 
livelihoods and standards of living that is achieved in this way, can political stability and 
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